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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
EVIDENCE
Physician-Patient Privilege-Waiver. In the recent case of Randa
v. Bear,' respondent Bear, sued by the assignee of a hospital which
had treated her for hypertension, cross-complained against the appel-
lant Grays Harbor County Medical Bureau on the ground that under
her contract with the Bureau it was liable for the charges. The parties
stipulated as to the fact of treatment, the necessity therefor, and the
reasonableness of the charges; but when in defense the Bureau made
an offer of proof by the respondent's doctor, the hospital records, and
the testimony of respondent herself that the ailment treated antedated
the service contract, and hence was not covered by its terms. Respond-
ent objected on the ground that the proffered testimony violated the
physician-patient privilege.' The trial court sustained the objection
and entered judgment for the stipulated amount against the Bureau.
On appeal the supreme court granted a new trial and held that the
appellant should have been allowed to present its defense, since the
filing of the cross-complaint waived the physician-patient privilege.
There was no physician-patient privilege regarding confidential com-
munications at common law.' The purpose of the statute creating the
privilege is to encourage the patient to more freely disclose the symp-
toms of his illnesses and injuries without fear that the physician might
reveal the communications in court.' Thus, the legislature has regarded
that the slight possibility that certain symptoms might not be disclosed
to a doctor because of this fear outweighs the court's search for truth
and justice. The utility of such a statute rests upon very narrow
grounds. The only type of condition that is commonly felt to be
embarrassing is one which society considers immoral, such as an ille-
gitimate pregnancy or a venereal disease.6 The privilege has become
a potent weapon in the hands of a plaintiff seeking to recover for an
alleged injury or illness, and the manifest unfairness of it has led the
courts to find a waiver in cases where it was abused.' Actual testimony
± 50 Wn.2d 415, 312 P.2d 640 (1957).
2 RCW 5.60.060 (4) : "A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent
of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending
such patient, which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient."
8 Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 573. Lord Mansfield: "If a surgeon
was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty of a breach of
honour, and of great indiscretion; but, to give that information in a court of justice,
which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any
indiscretion whatever."
4 Note 2 supra.
5 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE, 3rd Ed., § 2380a, P. 810.
6 Note 5 supra.
7 RCW 5.60.060 (4) : "A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent
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concerning the injury is a more typical form of waiver as found by the
courts than is commencement of the action. In Noelle v. Hoquiam
Lumber & Skingle Co.,' where the plaintiff had testified as to his
injuries without referring to what his physician had told him, the court
held there was no waiver of the privilege. The Randa case mentions
that this case is no longer the law in Washington.9 In McUne v.
Fuqua,"° also an action to recover for personal injuries, it was held that
plaintiff's testimony and that of certain physicians called by him
waived the privilege as to that injury."
The weight of authority holds that the commencement of an action
in which the plaintiff's illness or injury is an issue is not a waiver. 2
This view will allow a plaintiff to bring an action to recover for an
injury, which he will allege is serious, and at the same time deny the
defendant the opportunity to show that there is no injury or that the
injury is less serious than claimed, because the disclosure would be
too embarrassing to the plaintiff to be allowed in open court." Two
recent New York cases hold to the contrary. 4
of his patient, be examined..." (emphasis added). In re Quick, 161 Wash. 537, 297
Pac. 198 (1931). (Two physicians involved, both treated deceased at the same time,
all parties claiming under deceased. Held, the calling of one physician was a waiver
of the privilege as to the other) ; McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn.2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953).
(Personal injury action. Plaintiff testified as to his injuries and also had three physi-
cians testify. Defendant tried to get in testimony concerning plaintiff's health prior to
the alleged injury. Held, a waiver as to any testimony that would impeach or contra-
dict the testimony of the plaintiff or that which he offered.)
847 Wash. 519, 522, 92 Pac. 372 (1907). "The legislature made no exception to
the rule of secrecy where it was necessary to contradict falsehood, but provided for an
exception only in case of consent of the patient." Root J., joined by Hadley, C.J., in a
vigorous and persuasive dissent said that there should be a waiver when the patient
demonstrates that he no longer desires to keep the matter a secret by his own testimony
concerning the illness.
9 The court in the Randa case says that the Noelle case was previously abrogated
by Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 35 (Rule 35 itself was abrogated subse-
quent to the trial of the instant case by Rule 44). Rule 35 provided that the court
could order a physical examination of a party whose health is in issue, and that if the
party examined requested a copy of the report of the examination, he waived any privi-
lege he may have had regarding that condition. It is difficult to see how this rule
actually abrogated the Noelle case, unless it is considered that it is the power of the
court that operated as a waiver.
10 42 Wn.2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953).
11 It is unclear from the opinion whether either calling the physicians or the testi-
mony of the plaintiff would by itself be a waiver of the privilege. Hence the case does
not seem to directly overrule the Noelle case.
12 Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242 Mfinn. 265, 65 N.W.2d 185 (1954). (Bringing a per-
sonal injury action, plaintiff testified, and called expert witnesses to testify, concerning
her injuries. Held, no waiver.) ; see 8 WiGmoRE, EvIDENCE, 3rd Ed., § 2389, p. 832
et. seq.
13 8 WIGMORF, EVIDENCE, 3rd Ed., § 2389 p. 832 (quoted in the Randa case).
4 Van Heuverzwyn v. State, 134 N.Y.S.2d 922 (N.Y. Ct Cl. 1954). (In personal
injury action maintained by guardian ad litem of infant inmate of state hospital, state
claimed matters concerning the infant's injuries were privileged on a motion for dis-
covery; held, the guardian could waive for the infant and the bringing of the action was
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The Randa case pinpointed the problem. To sustain a recovery in
the action, respondent Bear would have had to show that the illness
did exist, that it was necessary that it be treated, and that the com-
pensation requested for the services was reasonable. However, the
parties stipulated these facts, and the respondent thus avoided any
possible waiver under the rule of the McUne case. The court felt that
the respondent should not be allowed to take an unfair advantage of
the stipulation, and held that since she obviously intended to intro-
duce medical testimony, she also intended to waive the privilege by
bringing the action.
The result in the Randa case is sensible. The case could be the begin-
ning of a trend to gradually cut down the privilege and limit it to
situations where it possibly belongs. It is hoped that such a waiver
will be found in all situations in which a plaintiff has "tendered his
injury into court," since the plaintiff thereby manifests his intention
that a disclosure of such injury will no longer embarrass him.
Hearsay- Business Records Exception -Hospital Records-
Scope of Admissible Matter. In Young v. Liddington' respondent
brought a malpractice action for an alleged negligent diagnosis and
treatment of a child. Respondent offered, and the trial court received
in evidence, a hospital record stating the maker's opinion as to the
cause of the patient's current ailment, the statement being based solely
on a narrative of the patient's mother and the patient's present con-
dition. On appeal from judgment on a verdict for respondent, the
supreme court reversed and granted a new trial. The court held that
while the Business Records Act' will qualify a hospital record without
resort to the common law exception to the hearsay rule, it applies only
to an "act, condition, or event" and will not permit the maker to
express, through the record, an opinion which he could not express in
court because not based upon evidence before the jury.
a waiver since proof of the injuries is necessary to recover) ; compare Eder v. Cashin,
281 App. Div. 456, 120 N.Y.S2d 165 (1953). (Personal injury suit; held, a waiver of
privilege as to previous mental illness of deceased was made by bringing the action.
The plaintiff put in issue the worth of the deceased's life and had to prove it. However,
another statute against disgracing the memory of the deceased kept the testimony out.)
150 Wn.2d 78, 309 P.2d 761 (1957).
2 RCW 5.45.020: "A record of an act, condition or event, shall in so far as relevant,
be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity
and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at
or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the
sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its
admission (formerly RCW 5.44.110).
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Business records are sufficiently accurate as a general rule for the
jury to consider them as evidence without the safeguard of cross
examination, and at common law are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. This rule, however, involves the preliminary proof of
identification and unavailability of the recorder, which in many cases
is too burdensome to be practical. Also, because the common law
exception is limited to those entries that were "regular," the cases
are in some conflict as to when an entry was "casual" or regularly
in the course of business.3 In Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co.,4 decided prior
to the adoption of the Business Records Act, an offer of a hospital
record was categorically rejected as hearsay. While the point was not
discussed as such, the court evidently did not regard the record as a
"business record."
The Business Records Act was adopted to allow the admission of
hearsay evidence contained in business records without resort to the
common law rule and its accompanying complexities. Hospital records
may be classed as business records within the meaning of the statute,'
and may be introduced to show a diagnostic finding by a physician.'
In the Young case, however, the opinion contained in the record was
not one which could have been admitted by means of oral testimony.'
As in Berndt v. Department of Labor and Industries,8 an expert medi-
cal opinion is not admissible if not made in response to facts estab-
lished in the record or made in response to a hypothetical question
that omits relevant facts established by the record. In the Young case
the record contained an opinion made without reference to another
previous hospital record (which was admitted as evidence in the
3 McCoR.'ICK, EvmENCF, § 287, p. 603.
4158 Wash. 696, 291 Pac. 1101 (1930).
5 RCV 5.45.010: "The term 'business' shall include every kind of business, profes-
sion, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or
not" (formerly RCW 5.44.100).
6 RCW 5.45.020: "A record of an act, condition, or event..." (emphasis added).
See, McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE, § 290, pp. 609, 612.
7 McGowan v. City of Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d 386, 223 P.2d 862 (1940). (In
a personal injury action the defendant attempted to get introduced as evidence a record
of a bloodtest without proof of whose blood was tested. Held, the Business Records
Act is only an exception to the hearsay rule and such a record is inadmissible without
proper identification.); accord, Reisman v. Los Angeles City School Dist, 123 Cal.
App.2d 493, 267 P.2d 36 (1954).
8 44 Wn.2d 138, 265 P.2d 1037 (1954). (The plaintiff attempted to prove that the
dermatitic condition contracted on her deceased husband's genitals had caused his death.
The allegation was that the infection had caused such a degree of worry-that the wife
would think it was a venereal disease-as to induce a coronary thrombosis. In answer
to a hypothetical question a medical expert testified that there was such causation.
Held, such an opinion was inadmissible where the hypothetical had not included the
established fact that the deceased had been advised by a doctor in the presence of his
wife, a nurse, that it was not a venereal disease.)
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instant case) and made in ignorance of a case of measles contracted
by the child subsequent to his last hospitalization.
It seems apparent that, while the Business Records Act has waived
the necessity for cross examination concerning certain hearsay records,
under the rule of the Young case opinions contained in the record must
meet the same standards as oral testimony.
DOUGLAS M. FRYER
LABOR RELATIONS
Federal Pre-Emption under Taft-Hartley-Interference with
Employment as an Unfair Labor Practice as well as a Common
Law Tort. In Selles v. Local 1431 the plaintiff had been a member
of the defendant union in which there was, early in 1952, some internal
strife. Selles was one of several members of the union who organized
a meeting of those dissatisfied with union policies concerning election
of officers and dissemination of information about union funds. Some
150 members who were not sympathetic to Selles marched en masse
into the meeting hall and broke up the meeting.
Within a few days following, Selles went to the union's hiring hall
to get a job assignment and was told there was no work for him. It
was determined as an ultimate fact that this was done in retaliation
for Selles' activities in organizing the grievance meeting. Selles was
not regularly employed for more than a year thereafter, and was
finally compelled to find less remunerative nonteamster work.
Selles filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board.
After they took jurisdiction, he withdrew the complaint and brought
suit in superior court on a common law tort theory-interference with
employment-and recovered damages measured by his loss of earnings.
On appeal the union maintained that its alleged misconduct con-
stituted an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act' and that, by this act, Congress had preempted the field.
The court, while agreeing that the union's conduct amounted to an
unfair labor practice under this section of the LMRA, nevertheless2
150 Wn2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957).
2 61 STAT. 140 (1947) 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1956). "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in 158 (a) (3)."
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1956). "It shall be an unfair
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